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1. Introduction
A characteristic feature of economic theories designed to explain the performance of human
societies over the very long run is that they are emphasizing the interaction between economic
and demographic variables as crucial for our understanding of economic development (see Galor,
2005, 2010 for surveys). Broadly speaking, these “uniﬁed growth theories” explain why the demo-
economic history of countries or regions can be conceptualized as subdivided into two periods:
the Malthusian era and the modern era. During the Malthusian era fertility and mortality are
high, the population is constant or slowly expanding fuelled by (relatively small) productivity
gains, and income stagnates at a low level. During the modern era fertility and mortality are
both low and productivity gains translate into perpetual economic growth at high and (ideally)
constant rates. Both eras are connected by a demographic transition during which mortality
and fertility decline, the population growth rate ﬁrst rises and then declines, and the economy
takes oﬀ.
This paper introduces a third era to the analysis of long-run growth, the post-modern era.
The characteristic feature of the post-modern era is a secular trend of declining population.
So far, the consequences of a declining population have been relatively little researched in the
ﬁeld of long-run economic growth. Many theories were based on the assumption of a constant
population. This assumption was until recently in line with many demographic projections,
which predicted that the demographic transition comes to its end when fertility rates approach
replacement level. For example, past population projections of the United Nations and the World
Bank assumed in their medium variants (which were regarded as most likely) that fertility rates
everywhere converge towards 2.1 births per women (Bongaarts, 1999).
Actually, however, the idea that the demographic transition stops at replacement level is
refuted by empirical evidence. The total fertility rate (TFR) fell below replacement level in the
1970s in Europe and Japan, in the 1980s in North America and Australia, and in the 1990s in the
Asian Tiger countries (Bongaarts, 2001). It is now below replacement level in all 50 European
countries but Turkey and in 80 countries in the world (UN, 2007). Table 1, compiled from UN
(2007), shows the most recently observed TFR for the G-8 countries, i.e. those countries that
2we usually associate with production at the “frontier of technological knowledge” (Aghion and
Howitt, 2009). In every country that contributes substantially to innovation-based, R&D-driven
growth the TFR is below replacement level.
Table 1: TFR for the G-8: 2005
USA 2.05 France 1.89
U.K. 1.82 Canada 1.53
Italy 1.38 Germany 1.36
Russia 1.34 Japan 1.24
Among the developed countries the U.S. is unique in displaying a TFR close to replacement
level. Table 2, compiled from U.S. National Center for Health Statistics (2010), shows that this
achievement originates solely from the high TFR of the Hispanic part of the population. The
TFR of non-Hispanic whites (1.83), for example, is close to that of their European forefathers.
Assuming that fertility behaviour of immigrants is at least partly rooted in the fertility norms
of their country of origin we expect fertility of the Hispanic population in the U.S. to fall
below replacement level with ongoing fertility transition in the countries of origin. Some Latin
American countries (e.g. Chile, Brazil, Cuba) display already fertility below replacement and for
other countries this seems to be likely in the future. In face of the observable trends, the United
Nations have recently updated their medium-variant projection, now assuming that all countries
in the world converge towards a TFR of 1.85 in the long run, i.e. a fertility pronouncedly below
replacement level (UN, 2007).





There is evidence, however, that the UN assumption of fertility rates converging towards 1.85
could be too optimistic. Strulik and Vollmer (2010) show that the countries of the world can
be subdivided into two fertility groups: in one group fertility rates are converging, in the other
group fertility rates are not converging, indicating that the fertility transition is not yet initiated
or yet too slow for catching up with the forerunners of the transition. For the convergence-group
Strulik and Vollmer show a strong linear correlation of initial fertility in 1950 (F50) and fertility
reduction 1950-2005 (∆F) with no indication of levelling oﬀ at low fertility rates. The prediction
3implied by the estimated β-convergence equation ∆F = 0.82 − 0.73F50 is a steady-state (long-
run equilibrium) at a TFR of 0.82/0.73 = 1.12, i.e. somewhat more than one child per women,
almost about half of replacement fertility.
The observation that fertility is below replacement in virtually every developed country has
motivated demographers to speak of “post-transitional” societies (e.g. Bongaarts, 2001). This
categorization, however, could be misleading. It could be interpreted as indicating that the
fertility transition has been accomplished. As shown above, this is not yet the case. Fertility
rates continue to fall, although – according to β convergence – at subsequently lower rates. It
may thus be more appropriate to follow van der Kaa (2001) and speak of post-modern societies.1
While post-modernity is a complex idea and post-modern values and their emphasis of private
life and material goods (instrumental post-modernism) or the public world and social goods
(humanist post-modernism) may aﬀect virtually every aspect of life, we focus here on one aspect:
the demand for children. The post-modern society is characterized by values and norms such
that couples on average give birth to fewer than two children (van de Kaa, 2001, Caldwell and
Schindlmayer, 2003, Preston and Hartnett, 2008). Subsequently we take preferences as given
and ask for the consequences on economic growth.
According to conventional theories of R&D-based growth, the fact that the population is
declining entails a grim economic outlook for post-modern societies. Models of the ﬁrst gen-
eration (Romer, 1990, Aghion and Howitt, 1992) provide the result that growth of aggregate
productivity (TFP) is linearly related to population size. Thus, a declining population implies
vanishing growth of productivity and income per capita. According to models of the second
generation (Jones, 1995, Kortum, 1997, Segerstrom, 1998), TFP growth is linearly related to
population growth. If we would rule out declining productivity, these models would predict for
the post-modern era stagnation of productivity and income per capita.2
Fortunately, the empirical evidence does not support these predictions. Many studies have
demonstrated a negative association between population growth and income growth (e.g. Bran-
der and Dowrik, 1994, Kelley and Schmidt, 1995, Ahituv, 2001, and Herzer et al., 2010). Also
1In the very long run it is probably also hard to imagine that world population declines forever, i.e. until extinction.
At some point we may expect that economic mechanism increase the rewards for children strongly enough to
initiate a turn of the fertility transition towards convergence to replacement level from below.
2R&D Models of the third generation (Peretto (1998), Young (1998) and Howitt (1999) combine features of
the earlier generations by investigating quality R&D and variety R&D. Assuming that there exist no knowledge
spillovers between quality and variety R&D they predict that only variety growth is essentially associated with
population growth while constant quality growth requires a constant population. See Jones (1999) for a survey
and Li (2000) for a critique and further generalization.
4the positive association between population growth and productivity growth predicted by con-
ventional R&D-based growth theory is hard to see in the data. Because knowledge spillovers
decline with distance and are smaller across countries than within countries (Jaﬀe et al., 1993,
Keller, 2002, Bottazzi and Peri, 2003), we would expect that at least some of the high TFP
growth generated in countries where population growth is high to be visible in the data. Figure
1 shows average annual population growth against average annual TFP growth from 1960 to
1998 (as calculated in Weil, 2005). Across all countries for which data is available (identiﬁed
in the Figure by blue crosses) the simple correlation is clearly negative; the estimated slope of
the regression by OLS is -0.17 (R2 = 0.18), see Bernanke and Guerkaynak (2001) for a similar
ﬁnding.
Figure 1: Population Growth vs. TFP Growth 1960 -1998



















Growth rates are average annual growth rates 1960-1998 in percent as compiled in
Weil (2005). Blue crosses: all available countries, green circles: OECD countries, red
squares: G7 countries.
For a proper check of R&D-based growth theory, however, it seems reasonable to reduce the
sample, acknowledging the fact that less developed countries – where usually population growth
is highest – do not much advance TFP growth by market R&D activities. But if we focus just
on OECD countries (green circles in the Figure) the predicted positive association is still not
visible (the estimated slope of the regression line is -0.13, R2 = 0.06). Even if we assume that
conventional R&D-based growth theory applies foremost to the G7 countries, i.e. a small group
of countries that pushes the world technology frontier (identiﬁed in the Figure by red squares),
5the predicted positive association remains invisible (the “estimated” slope of the regression line
is -0.22, R2 = 0.29).
Shifting the focus towards population levels and a historical perspective of technology evo-
lution over the very long-run, Comin et al. (2010) have recently shown that across countries
the present level of technology is positively associated with the level of technology in the year
1500 and negatively associated with population size in 1500. Interestingly they have also shown
a positive association of population size in year 0 AD with the level of technology in 1500.
Thus the population push view that a larger population produces more ideas (see also Kremer,
1993, Strulik and Weisdorf, 2008) seems to be true in the ancient and medieval past but not for
modern societies. The present paper oﬀers an explanation for this phenomenon by arguing that
the reversal occurred when a child-quantity substitution became operative and parents began
to invest in education of their children.
Below we will reﬁne the view on the human factor in TFP growth and argue that it is
not the sheer number of workers (L) that propels the creation of ideas and the advancement of
productivity but the total amount of knowledge embodied in these workers, i.e. aggregate human
capital (H). The most intuitive aggregation is probably that aggregate human capital is given
by human capital per worker h times the number of workers (H = h · L). Utilizing this notion
of human capital and endogenizing the incentive to acquire it through costly schooling, a couple
of papers have demonstrated that human capital growth can take over the role of population
growth in R&D-based growth models by predicting that productivity growth can be sustained
with constant or declining population as long as human capital is accumulated rapidly enough.
This prediction is less easily refuted by the data since empirical evidence supports a positive
association between proxies of human capital accumulation and growth of income per capita
and TFP.3
While the integration of human capital accumulation into R&D-based growth theory provides
a way around the need for constant population size or a positive rate of population growth in
order to sustain long-run economic growth, the so far available literature has left unsolved the
problem of the potentially negative association of population growth and TFP growth. To be
3For theory see, among others, Arnold (1998), Funke and Strulik (2000), Dalgaard and Kreiner (2001), Strulik
(2005), Dalgaard and Jensen (2009), Grossmann (2010). For evidence see Bernanke and Guerkaynak (2001), Barro
(2001), Krueger and Lindahl (2001). Authors of the original R&D-based growth model sometimes acknowledge
the fact that it is H rather than L that drives the development of new ideas, see e.g. Romer (1990). However,
this observation has not motivated them to integrate an explanation of the accumulation of H into the model.
6speciﬁc, acknowledging that aggregate human capital, H = h·L, matters for the creation of new
ideas, the fundamental problem is to explain why productivity growth seems to be positively
associated with increasing h and negatively associated with increasing L. This problem remained
unsolved because the available literature has neglected the interaction of quantity and the
quality of the workforce.
Indeed, there exists no obvious way to explain at the macro-level how L and h could potentially
contribute conversely to the aggregate h · L. On the micro-level, however, there exists a well-
established and tested theory precisely for this, the Beckerian child quantity-quality trade-oﬀ
(Becker, 1960, Rosenzweig, Wolpin, 1980, Rosenzweig, 1990, Hanushek, 1992). This mechanism,
which plays also a crucial role in uniﬁed growth theory (Galor, 2005), allows parents to substitute
child quality for child quantity such that h rises and L falls. If the substitution is such that
h rises more strongly than L falls, the micro-foundation can motivate that aggregate human
capital H in a society rises although the population declines. If, in turn, the development of
ideas and thus TFP growth is driven by H, the micro-foundation explains why we observe a
negative association between TFP growth and population growth at the macro-level.
Utilizing these ideas, the present paper integrates for the ﬁrst time a micro-founded child
quantity-quality trade-oﬀ into R&D-based growth theory and shows why and how a change of
preferences towards less children can provide the result of increasing aggregate human capital.
This way, R&D-based growth theory is accommodated to the evidence on education, fertility
and TFP growth. At the same time the “old” theory is not completely abandoned. It is
still there when the corner solution for education applies. If preferences do not support a
quantity-quality substitution, increasing fertility and population growth contribute positively to
economic growth as evidenced for most of human history. On the other hand, if the quantity-
quality trade-oﬀ is operative, the direction of the aggregate eﬀect is independent from family
size and, in particular, also observed for fertility below replacement level. Taken together these
results identify child quantity-quality substitution as the causal driver of R&D-based growth for
post-modern societies.4
The paper is organized as follows. The next section sets up the model. Section 3 analyses the
balanced growth path and proves our main results. Section 4 investigates the corner solution and
4So far, a few scientiﬁc articles have integrated endogenous fertility into R&D-based growth, notably Jones
(2001), Connolly and Peretto (2003) and Growiec (2006). Articles integrating education have been referenced
above. To our best knowledge, an integration of the simultaneous fertility-education decision, the crucial element
that establishes growth for the post-modern society, does not yet exist.
7how the new theory relates to the existing literature. Section 5 speciﬁes the model numerically,
investigates adjustment dynamics and compares economic growth in the modern era and the
post-modern era. The ﬁnal section concludes with a tentative outlook for future economic
development.
2. The Model
2.1. Households. Consider an economy populated by three overlapping generations, children,
young adults, and old adults. Children consume the provisions received by their parents and
(possibly) experience an increase of their human capital endowment through education. Old
adults consume their savings plus interest. Young adults supply one unit of labour and decide
how to split their income between current consumption and future consumption, how many
children they want to have, and how much they want to spend on their children’s education.
In order to convey the basic theory conveniently and to get explicit solutions, we make a
number of simplifying assumptions. Each household consists of one parent (which avoids to
tackle matching problems), there is no mortality in childhood and young adulthood (which
avoids problems of uncertain survival), children are a continuous number (which avoids problems
of indivisibility), and the motive of child expenditure is non-operational (which avoids problems
of maximizing dynastic value functions). This means that parents’ motivation to spend on
children’s education is not driven by the anticipation of the increase of children’s utility caused
by this expenditure but by a “warm glow” of giving (Andreoni, 1989) or the desire for having
“higher quality”children (Becker, 1960).
To be speciﬁc let c1
t and c2
t denote consumption of the young and old in period t. The
currently young, facing a gross interest rate Rt+1, and making a savings decision st, expect
future consumption c2
t+1 = Rt+1st. A young adult’s human capital is denoted by ht and the
wage per unit of human capital is denoted by wt. Let nt denote the number of children and τ
the time cost involved in having a child. Besides these necessary costs, parents may voluntarily
spend et per child, conceptualized in the Beckerian sense as child quality expenditure. Plugged
into a function for education, quality expenditure determines the human capital endowment of
next period’s generation (ht+1). Since the parameters of education and futures wages are given
to the single adult, having expenditure et or next period’s endowments ht+1, or wage income of
their children wt+1ht+1 in the utility function leads to equivalent results. Summarizing, young




t + β log(Rt+1st) + γ loget + η lognt
subject to the budget constraint wtht(1 − τnt) = c1
t + st + ntet. The positive parameters β, γ,
and η denote the weights of future consumption, child expenditure, and family size for utility,
i.e. the importance of these elements relative to current consumption.
The solution of the decision problem for current consumption is ct = wtht/(1 + β + η) and
the solutions for savings, child expenditure, and fertility are
st =
βwtht








(1 + β + η)τ
. (3)
We assume η > γ so that the problem has indeed a positive interior solution. Inspect the
solution to verify that a decrease of η, i.e. of the importance of family size for utility, implies
lower fertility and higher expenditure per child. The same results (with respect to direction not
with respect to the strength of the eﬀect) are observed for an increase of the importance of child
expenditure γ and an increase of the time costs of children τ. The quantity-quality trade-oﬀs
initiated by these parametric changes will be at the center of the study of comparative statics
of the balanced growth path later on. In particular we associate with a post-modern society –
in line with the arguments developed in the Introduction – a suﬃciently low weight on family
size γ such that a couple of adults has less than 2.1 children (nt < 1.05).
2.2. Education. Child expenditure et is transformed into human capital of the next generation
of young adults via a schooling technology. A reasonable technology does not just translate
expenditure one to one into human capital but controls also for the costs of schooling. These
costs can be conveniently approximated by the wage wt, i.e. the cost of a unit of human capital of









9where AE signiﬁes general productivity of schooling. If education expenditure is too small or
productivity of schooling is too low, the next generation will have the same human capital
endowment as the current generation and as the generations before. This constant level of skills
is normalized to unity.5










For the subsequent investigation we focus on an interior solution, i.e. the case where there is
actually growth of human capital. Later on we return to the corner solution of constant human
capital.6
2.3. Firms: Overview. The set-up of ﬁrms and markets follows closely Romer (1990) and
Jones (1995). The economy consists of three sectors: The R&D-sector is perfectly competitive
and employs scientists to create new ideas in the form of blueprints, manifested in patents. A
patent is needed as ﬁxed input in a monopolistically competitive sector to produce a specialized
capital good. Purchase of a patent allows a capital goods producer to transform one unit of
raw capital, i.e. one unit of individual’s savings, into one blueprint-speciﬁc machine. A perfectly
competitive ﬁnal goods sector uses these machines and workers to assemble a consumption
aggregate.
Aside from the set-up in discrete time the “only” modiﬁcation of the ﬁrm’s side of the Romer-
Jones model is that the human factor in production is human capital Ht = htLt where Lt is the
size of the current generation of young adults. Note that this aggregation of individual human
capital ht implies an inﬁnite elasticity of substitution between human capital per person and
persons. It means that any lack of human capital that a ﬁrm’s currently employed workers may
display can be taken care of by just employing more workers of the same skill level.
2.4. Final goods sector. Since the ﬁrms’ side of the model – aside from the special role of
human capital – coincides with the Romer-Jones set-up, description can be brief. The ﬁnal
5Whereas some elements of the schooling function could be made more general, controlling for the teacher-
generation’s wage is essential for dynamic stability. Otherwise human capital would grow hyper-exponentially,
driven by increasing ht and rising wt. A similar control for the current state of quality is known to be essential
for stability in R&D-driven quality improvements of products, see e.g. Li (2000).
6The assumption that human capital creation is a linear function of the expenditure share of education has
provided a linear diﬀerence equation for human capital accumulation across generations. This linearity makes
perpetual long-run growth possible. If there are decreasing returns there will be no (exponential) growth in the
long-run. We discuss this possibility in the Conclusion.







where Yt is output and HY
t is employment. The parameter α is the capital share in ﬁnal goods
production, xi,t is the amount of a certain machine i used in ﬁnal goods production and At is
the state of technology, i.e. the number of available diﬀerentiated inputs. Facing a wage wt per
unit of human capital, and rental prices pi,t for capital inputs i = 1,...,A, the indirect demand
functions are given by












2.5. Capital Goods Production. Producers of specialized inputs transform one unit of raw
capital into one unit of specialized capital such that kt = xt. Operating proﬁts of an intermediate
goods producer πi,t are thus given by πi,t = pi,t(xi,t)ki,t−rtki,t = α(HY
t )1−α(ki,t)α−rtki,t where
rt denotes the interest rate that has to be paid for individual’s savings. Solving the associated
problem of proﬁt maximization facing demand (7) leads to the price of pi,t = pt = rt/α for all
i = 1,...,A types of machines so that the machine-speciﬁc index can be dropped.
Free entry into capital goods production implies that in equilibrium operating proﬁts are
covering the ﬁxed costs of production originating from purchasing a patent. In slight deviation
from the original set-up and inspired by Aghion and Howitt (2009, Chapter 4) we assume
that a patent holds for one period (i.e. one generation) and that afterwards the monopoly
right to produce a good passes to someone chosen at random from the next generation. This
simpliﬁcation helps to avoid intertemporal (dynastic) problems of patent holding and patent
pricing while keeping the basic incentive to create new knowledge intact. Summarizing, free
entry implies πi,t = πt = pA
t where pA
t is the price of a patent (blueprint).
Because capital goods are sold at the same price and demanded at equal quantities, xi,t = xt,
they can easily be added up to the aggregate capital stock Kt = Atxt. Inserting this information





11On the aggregate the number of developed specialized inputs appears as aggregate productivity
in goods production and, following the literature, we will associate growth of A with growth of
aggregate factor productivity (TFP).
2.6. R&D. Between periods t and t + 1 competitive R&D-ﬁrms employ HA
t researchers to
develop At+1 − At new blueprints and sell them at price pA
t . Facing research productivity δ
output is given by
At+1 − At = δHA
t . (9)
Research productivity δ is given to the single ﬁrm but depends, on the aggregate level, positively
on the number of already existing ideas (0 < φ < 1, standing-on-shoulders eﬀect) and possibly
negatively on the number of researchers (0 ≤ ν < 1, stepping-on-toes), δ = ¯ δAφL−ν, where
¯ δ > 0 is a scaling parameter. Note that the negative stepping-on-toes eﬀect increases in the
number of researchers Lt, not in aggregate human capital Ht. The reason is that there cannot
be stepping-on-toes with respect to ht because the same researcher will not be paid to develop
the same idea twice. Two researchers, in contrast, may indeed independently develop the same
idea twice, in particular if they are employed by diﬀerent R&D ﬁrms.
Maximization of proﬁts pA
t δHA
t −wtHA
t leads to labour demand such that wt = δpA
t . Labour





2.7. Market Clearing and Equilibrium Dynamics. In equilibrium, wages in goods pro-
duction and R&D equalize such that δpA
t = (1 − α)Yt/HY
t . By inserting demand (7) into the
goods price pt = rt/α and the result into proﬁts, the free entry condition can be written as
pA
t = πt = α(1 − α)Yt/At. Next, use these two equations for pA
t to eliminate the price of
blueprints and to arrive at labour demand HY
t = A/(αδ) and thus HA
t = Ht − A/(αδ).
Inserting employment of researchers HA
t from (10), the deﬁnition of R&D productivity δ, and
the deﬁnition of aggregate human capital into research output (9) provides the evolution of TFP
as a function of current TFP At, human capital per person ht, and size of the workforce Lt,







which constitutes the human-capital augmented Romer-Jones result.
12The size of workforce grows at the fertility rate,
Lt+1 = ntLt. (12)
For a given set of parameters fertility stays constant according to (3) implying that the number
of children (ntLt) and of old people (Lt/n) evolves “in sync” with the workforce Lt.
For convenience physical capital is assumed to fully depreciate between periods t and t + 1
such that next period’s capital stock consists of this period’s savings. Inserting into Kt+1 = stLt
the solution for savings (1) and wages from (6) and (8) and substituting HY
t = A/(αδ) provides





with B ≡ β(1 − α)(α¯ δ)α/(1 + β + η). The evolution of the economy is fully described by the
four-dimensional system (4) and (11)-(13).
3. Analysis: Balanced Growth
3.1. The Inverse Correlation between Productivity Growth and Population Growth.
Let, in line with the literature, a balanced growth path be deﬁned as a state of the economy
at which growth rates do not change. For any variable z, the growth rate is denoted by gz,t =
(zt+1 − zt)/zt and its rate of change by ˆ gz,t ≡ (gzt+1 − gzt)/gzt. Balanced growth thus requires
ˆ gz = 0 for z = A,K,h,L. Given the simple structure of the model, these conditions are always





















Superﬁcial inspection thus seemingly suggests that TFP growth and population growth are
positively correlated. This is the macro-view of the economy, which disregards interaction on
the micro-level and seemingly predicts – in line with the available R&D-based growth literature
– that higher population growth leads to higher productivity growth.
From micro-foundation, however, we have derived that both human capital and fertility are
endogenous and via the quantity-quality trade-oﬀ inversely correlated. Inserting nt and ht+1










(1 + β + η)τ
￿1−ν
.
For further analysis note that the most positive role that population growth could possibly play
exists when there is no congestion in research, i.e. for ν = 0. In this case the expression simpliﬁes
further and the balanced growth rate of TFP and – after inserting (3) into (12) – the population









(1 + β + η)τ
− 1. (15b)
Inspecting the growth rates shows that a preference shock in terms of increasing weight of child
quality in utility, γ, causes gA to rise and gL to fall. The opposite holds true for a decreasing
weight of child quantity in utility. A proposition summarizes the main result of the paper.
Proposition 1. A change of preferences resulting in a child quantity-quality substitution leads
on the aggregate to increasing TFP growth and decreasing population growth, i.e. it supports a
negative correlation between TFP growth and population growth.
Note that congestion in research (ν > 0) ampliﬁes the eﬀect by reducing the role of nt in TFP
growth. More importantly, note that the result is independent from the size of nt. In particular,
it holds also when population growth gL = nt − 1 is negative. Declining population is good for
TFP growth.
For an intuition of the result recall the deﬁnition of aggregate human capital Ht = htLt.
Without congestion a positive eﬀect of declining population on productivity requires that the
change of child quality exceeds the change of child quantity such that ht grows more than Lt






















1 + β + η
> 0.
Note that the mechanism behind the result originates from the budget constraint and not from
the utility function. We can thus be conﬁdent that it will hold for more general forms of
utility as well. The crucial element in the budget constraint is the time costs of children τ.
To see this clearly consider a unit increase of et in company with a unit reduction of nt such
14that total voluntary child expenditure ntet remains constant. This one-to–one quantity-quality
substitution is not neutral. It sets free income τwtht because less time is needed for child rearing
so that more time can be supplied on the labour market. The additionally earned income can
be spend on current and future consumption and on further child expenditure et implying that
the negative eﬀect from reduction of fertility is smaller than the positive eﬀect on human capital
such that Ht = htnt rises.
The intuition for a change of η is obtained analogously. An interesting side-eﬀect of a decrease
of η is that it – according to (1) – implies also a higher savings rate. Decreasing η can thus
explain the empirical regularity of a positive association of productivity growth and the savings
rate (see Bernanke and G¨ urkaynak, 2001).
Interestingly, equation (15) predicts that a change of time costs for children (τ) aﬀects pop-
ulation growth but not productivity growth. The intuition can be developed as above. Rising
costs of children lead to lower fertility and higher voluntary expenditure per child. Obviously
the negative eﬀect on aggregate human capital Ht = htLt through lower fertility and the posi-
tive eﬀect via higher human capital growth per capita are exactly levelling each other such that
Ht+1/Ht = γAE/(1 + β + η) independently from τ and thus ∂(Ht+1/Ht)/∂τ = 0.
The mechanics behind the result originate again from the budget constraint, but this time
log-utility and its feature of balancing income and substitution eﬀects plays a role as well.
Higher child costs lead to lower child demand nt and lower available income (1−τnt)wtht. With
unchanged preferences income and substitution eﬀect are balancing each other such that total
expenditure ntet remains constant. A utility function supporting a higher substitution eﬀect
would imply an overcompensating eﬀect of human capital over fertility.
With respect to productivity growth, however, complicating the utility function is not required
in order to obtain over-compensation of the fertility eﬀect. If there is congestion in R&D, i.e. if
ν > 0 in gA = n1−ν
t (ht+1/ht), then the positive eﬀect through rising human capital dominates the
negative eﬀect through falling fertility, an observation, which proves the following proposition.
Proposition 2. If there is congestion in R&D (stepping on toes) then increasing time costs
for rearing children lead to lower population growth and higher TFP growth and thus a negative
correlation between TFP growth and population growth.
3.2. Income Growth and Population Growth. In order to examine the rest of the model,
we evaluate (13) along the balanced growth path (i.e. for ˆ gK = 0) and substitute (ht+1/ht) from













Without congestion in R&D (ν = 0) the model predicts that growth of physical capital along the
balanced growth path correlates positively with TFP growth but not with population growth.
For φ → 1 the model predicts that the capital stock grows at the rate of TFP growth. Note
the diﬀerence to neoclassical growth theory, which predicts that the capital stock grows at the
rate of TFP growth plus the rate of population growth. With human capital and R&D being
endogenous, a positive association between capital growth and population growth emerges “only”
when there is congestion in research.
Finally, substitute labour demand HY
t = At/(αδ) into production (8) and take time-diﬀerences
to get output growth gY t = (1+gKt)α(1+gAt)(1−α)(2−φ)(1+gLt)ν(1−α)−1. Insert this information
into growth of output per worker yt = Yt/Lt, i.e. into (1+gyt) = (1+gY t)/(1+gLt). In order to
evaluate income per capita growth along the balanced growth path insert gA and gK from (14)
and (16) to arrive at



















Without congestion in R&D (ν = 0), superﬁcial inspection suggests again a seemingly positive
association between income growth gy and population growth (fertility).
However, with contrast to conventional R&D-based growth theory, the result is reconciled with
the empirical facts by inserting nt and ht+1 from (3) and (4), providing for the case without
congestion













Taking the derivatives with respect to γ and η provides a result analogously to Proposition 1.
Proposition 3. A change of preferences resulting in a child quantity-quality substitution leads
on the aggregate to increasing income per capita growth and decreasing population growth.
Furthermore, since 2 − φ > 1:
Proposition 4. An increase of child-rearing costs leads on the aggregate to increasing income
per capita growth and decreasing population growth.
16In contrast to productivity growth, congestion is not required for the result that a one-to-one
child quantity-quality substitution has an impact on income growth. Since aggregate capital
grows independently from population proportionally to productivity growth, the only eﬀect of
population growth originates through the “neoclassical” capital dilution eﬀect. More people
imply lower shares of capital and income per person. If there is congestion in R&D (ν > 0)
the negative impact of population growth on income growth is further ampliﬁed through its
dampening eﬀect on productivity growth.
We can compare R&D eﬀort along the steady-state with the earlier R&D-based growth models.
Models of the ﬁrst generation (Romer, 1990; Aghion and Howitt, 1992) predict constant TFP
growth for constant number of researchers. For this to be true the knife-edge assumption φ = 1
has to hold. Models of the second generation (Jones, 1995, Segerstrom, 1998) predict based
on φ < 1 that constant TFP growth is realized for a constant population share of researchers
and positive population growth, implying that constant economic growth requires a perpetually
rising number of people employed in R&D and perpetually rising R&D expenditure. Ha and
Howitt (2007) have argued that empirical evidence for the U.S. growth experience after 1950
supports models of the ﬁrst generation. Models of the ﬁrst generation, however, have the
unpleasant features of being based on the knife-edge assumption φ = 1 and of relying on a
constant population. The present theory reconciles the earlier theories. It abandons the knife-
edge assumption but preserves the empirical relevant associations between research eﬀort and
TFP.
Proposition 5. At the steady-state constant TFP growth is associated with a constant share
of the population working in R&D and constant R&D expenditure share of GDP. These results
hold true for φ < 1 irrespective of whether the number of people employed in R&D is rising,
constant, or declining. If the population stays constant, constant TFP growth implies a constant
number of workers engaged in R&D.
For a proof let the number of workers in goods production be denoted by LY
t . Begin with not-
ing that the share of workers in goods production is given by LY
t /Lt = (htLY
t )(htLt)/ = HY
t /Ht.
Insert HY
t = At/(αδHt) and the deﬁnitions of Ht and δ to get LY




clude from (14) that numerator and denominator of this expression are growing at equal rates
at the steady-state. Thus LY
t /Lt stays constant implying a constant population share in R&D.
17For the second part of the proof, R&D expenditure is given by Rt = wtHA
t and its share of
GDP by Rt/Yt = wtHA
t /Yt. Insert wages from (6) to get Rt/Yt = (1 − α)HA
t /HY
t , which is
constant since HY
t /Ht and HA
t /Ht are constant along the steady-state.
3.3. Pre-Modern Times. The present theory proposes a theory of R&D-driven technological
progress which predicts a negative association of TFP growth and population growth, a result
that is not rejected by cross-country data for the second half of the 20th century. For most part
of human history, however, Kremer (1993) has impressively documented a positive association
between population growth and TFP growth. Strictly speaking, the present model is indeed
inappropriate to analyse pre-modern growth. In pre-modern times market R&D contributes
little to productivity growth (Mokyr, 2001) and a Malthusian mechanism is operative preventing
that TFP growth translates into income per capita growth (Galor, 2005).
Overstretching the theory a bit to make a statement about pre-modern times is neverthe-
less useful for an assessment of conventional R&D-based growth. For that purpose suppose
that education assumes the the corner solution. Parental preference for education (γ) is too
low or productivity of the schooling system (AE) is too low such that (4) implies ht+1 =
max{AEγτ/(η − γ)ht, 1} = 1 and therefore for all t > 1 that (ht+1/ht) = 1. A constant
level of human capital per capita is probably a good ﬁrst approximation for most of the history





The obvious – and this time indeed correct – conclusion is that there is a unique positive asso-
ciation between productivity growth and population growth. This special case is the overlapping
generations version of the standard R&D-based growth model (Jones, 1995).
4. Growth in Modern vs. Post-Modern Societies
Summarizing we can distinguish three stages or eras of economic growth.
(1) Pre-modern growth as the era during which economic growth is driven solely by pop-
ulation growth (conventional second generation R&D-based growth theory, the corner
solution of the present model).
(2) Modern growth as the era during which population growth is low and R&D-based eco-
nomic growth is driven by both increasing number of researchers and increasing human
18capital per person (conventional R&D-based growth theory with human accumulation,
the interior solution of the present model when n > 1).
(3) Post-modern growth as the era during which the population is declining and R&D-based
economic growth is fuelled solely by human capital growth (the present model when the
interior solution holds with n < 1.
Since Proposition 4 and 5 hold irrespective of the size of n we can conclude
Corollary 1. Growth of income per capita is – ceteris paribus – higher for the post-modern
society than for the modern society.
The explanation remains the same as developed with Proposition 1. A change of preferences
that leads to a child quantity-quality substitution frees extra parental time that is used to earn
extra income of which a part is invested in education. As a consequence the positive impact
of education exceeds the negative impact of population size such that aggregate human capital
H = h · L and TFP are growing at higher rates than before. If there is congestion in R&D a
second positive eﬀect shows up because there is less stepping-on-toes.
Table 3: 2 Societies
Modern Post-Modern








Parameters for both: α = 0.4, β = 0.8 (implied savings rate s = 0.22
and s = 0.24), γ = 1, AE = 4.5, δ = 1, φ = 0.3, ν = 0. Annual
growth rates along the balanced growth path in percent. Conversion
from generational to annual rates assumes a length of a generation of
20 years.
Table 3 illustrates the result with a numerical example. Generational growth rates are con-
verted to annual ones in order to better convey the result that the model produces growth rates
in empirically plausible magnitudes. We assume a capital share of 0.4, an investment rate of
0.22, and that in a Modern Society, a couple has 2.2 children, i.e. fertility is slightly above
replacement level. The implied preference parameters are β = 0.8, γ = 1 and η = 1.8 and the
19implied population growth rate is 0.53 percent. Setting AE = 4.5 provides growth of human
capital per capita at rate 0.59, i.e. growth of quantity and quality contribute about the same to
aggregate human capital growth. Setting δ = 1,φ = 0.3 and ν = 0 predicts a TFP growth rate
of 1.6 percent, a growth rate of aggregate GDP of 2.7 percent and a growth rate of income per
capita of 2.2 percent.
The Post-modern Society shares all parameters with the Modern Society aside from a shift of
preferences. The weight for children η is 1.6 (instead of 1.8). The induced child quantity-quality
substitution implies that a post-modern couple has 1.76 children, which is about the average
value observed across the G-8 countries in 2005. The population shrinks now at an annual rate
0.6 percent. However, as explained above, individual human capital growth overcompensates
the quantity eﬀect. It grows at a rate of 2 percent such that aggregate human capital and TFP
grow at a higher rate than before (at 1.4 and 2 percent). Consequently aggregate GDP and
income per capita grow at higher rate than before. For income per capita the model predicts
almost a doubling of steady-state growth.
We can use the example to illustrate adjustment dynamics. Figure 1 shows the transition
from a modern society to a post-modern one by assuming that the modern society rests at the
steady-state of Table 3 and that at time 20 (i.e. after one generation) a preference change of
η from 1.8 to 1.6 occurs. While population and human capital adjust monotonously, there are
damped cycles of TFP growth and of income per capita growth (due to the non-linear nature
of R&D production (11). As a consequence, focussing the observation on a wrong time-window
(e.g. between year 40 and 60) could misleadingly provoke the conclusion that income growth and
TFP growth are declining for the post modern society. Comparing larger time-windows (and in
the limit steady-states) avoids this fallacy and produces the conclusion of higher growth for the
post-modern society in the long-run.
5. Conclusion
In this paper we have integrated into an R&D-based growth model an endogenous, micro-
founded evolution of population growth and human capital accumulation and have shown how
this modiﬁes some conclusions from earlier R&D-driven growth theory. While earlier models (in
the spirit of Romer 1990 or Jones 1995) predicted that population growth is positively associ-
ated with economic growth, or even – in the Jones case – essential for having economic growth
20Figure 2: Adjustment Dynamics: Postmodern Society















































































































































Parameters from Table 3. Initially: modern society. In year 20 (after one generation): η = 1.6.
Convergence towards Post-modern society from Table 3).
at all, our micro-founded theory predicts that population growth is negatively associated with
productivity growth and income growth. It is therewith harder to falsify by the available data
for the 20th century.
Since we have maintained all central elements from the ﬁrms’ side of R&D-based growth
theory it is clear that the new result originates from the households’ side. The basic mechanism
is generated by the interaction of child quality and quantity in the households’ budget constraint
independently from the speciﬁcation of preferences so that we are conﬁdent that our result will
be robust against a sophistication of the households’ utility function.
Speciﬁcally, a substitution of child quantity n by child quality (i.e. expenditure on education)
e that keeps total child expenditure e · n constant sets free parental time, which can be used to
earn extra income. Parts of the additional income is spend on children such that overall child
expenditure rises more strongly than child quantity falls. At the macro side of the economy this
trade-oﬀ means that human capital per person h increases more strongly than the number of
persons L falls such that total available human capital h·L increases. Given that human capital
is the driving force in R&D this entails higher R&D output and higher R&D-based growth.
Of course our proposed growth motor can be easily choked oﬀ by assuming a more pessimistic
function for education. The crucial assumption for perpetual growth is not that there are no
21decreasing returns to education expenditure. In equilibrium the expenditure share of education
is constant (the OLG equivalent of a constant share of life-time spent on education in the non-
overlapping generations, Mincer-type approach to education). Indeed the model can be easily
generalized towards decreasing returns. The crucial assumption for perpetual growth is the
linear intergenerational transmission of human capital, i.e. the assumption that the current
generation is capable to transport its knowledge times a multiplier larger than one to the next
generation. While it is impossible to say whether such a process of knowledge transmission can
be sustained forever, it is in any case easier conceivable than a perpetually growing population.
Human capital is a metaphysical entity measured in value-units (compare, for example, the value
of knowledge acquired by a university study of medical science now and 100 years ago) whereas
population is a physical entity bounded by physical constraints (for example, space on earth).
Instead of venturing forth into the domain of speculation about the distant future of humanity
we would like to emphasize that our model is a metaphor to explain economic growth in the
recent past (say the last century), the present, and the near future (say within the limit of the
time horizon of the UN population projections). It is not a theory for economic growth in the
very distant future. In the recent past, we observed high TFP growth in line with high growth
of human capital and low and increasingly negative population growth, and we expect these
trends to continue for a while. In this respect the main message delivered by the model is an
optimistic one: the fact that fertility is below replacement level and population is declining is
less threatening than suggested by conventional R&D-based growth theory. On the contrary,
taking child quantity-quality substitution into account, fertility below replacement could be an
early indicator for high future productivity growth.
In the very long-run it is likely that the UN predictions of fertility below replacement and
negative population growth run against physical and economic limits. If population density be-
comes too thin we would expect indivisibilities to occur and technologies to become increasingly
resistant against quantity-quality substitution (for example, it could take at least one person to
steer a vehicle, to run a ﬁrm, or – within the context of the model – to invent a new design for
an intermediate good). We would then expect that markets and/or policy reacts by generating a
lower relative price of children and/or a higher relative price of raw labour in production. With
ongoing adjustment of prices we would probably expect indeed convergence towards a stable
population in the very long-run.
22Here we have treated the preference change that triggered the transition towards the post-
modern society as exogenous in order to focus on the power of the child-quantity quality trade-
oﬀ in R&D-based growth. The model would of course gain more realism if the transition were
generated endogenously in the spirit of uniﬁed growth theory. An interesting framework for
integrating the post-modern era into uniﬁed growth theory is provided by Strulik and Weisdorf
(2008). They show how in a two-sector economy steeply increasing TFP in manufacturing and
the associated decrease of prices for manufactured goods in the 20th century explain declining
fertility below replacement (i.e. a post-modern era of increasing consumerism) and how market
forces restore fertility at replacement level in the very long-run. Combining their demo-economic
theory with the quantity-quality theory of R&D-based growth is a challenging task for the future.
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